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Navy Medicine's primary mission, and most important responsibility, is to
provide combat-ready professional medical personnel to support the operational
forces of the Navy and Marine Corps team. It is imperative that those designated to
support operational forces receive appropriate readiness skill training to meet the
mission of the platform to which they are assigned. [Ref. 1] Navy Medicine must be
prepared to respond effectively and rapidly to the entire spectrum ofpotential military
operations, from multiple Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) to Operations Other
Than War (OOTW).
Preparing medical department personnel for the special needs of operational
medicine involves education and training beyond that of traditional medicine in a
peacetime setting. This is known as medical readiness training. Navy medicine, by
virtue of it's primary mission, must continuously engage in medical readiness
training. The program that provides policy and procedures for this is the Department
of the Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), Medical Augmentation
Program. The purpose of this thesis is to examine this program, determine its
effectiveness, and make recommendations to correct any identified deficiencies.
B. MEDICAL READINESS
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines medical readiness as
the ability to mobilize, deploy and sustain field medical services for any
operation requiring military services; to maintain and project the
continuum of healthcare resources required to provide for the health of
the force; and to operate in conjunction with beneficiary health care.
[Ref. 2]
This can further be divided into Navy medicine's three missions; wartime/
contingency, day-to-day operational support and peacetime health benefit.
1. Wartime/Contingency
The wartime/contingency mission is defined as providing medical care to the
entire spectrum of potential military operations, from multiple Major Regional
Conflicts to Operations Other Than War. The National strategy on Major Regional
Conflicts is deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by
potentially hostile regional powers such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. As an adjunct
to our national interest, the U.S. envisions humanitarian assistance as an additional
mission for the Armed Forces. Domestically, there is great uncertainty about new
roles and missions the military may be assigned. The use of military resources within
the United States for nonmilitary roles (e.g., Civil-Military Cooperative Action
projects) is currently being tested and encouraged. The pursuit of these initiatives
clearly marks departure from past requirements. [Ref. 2] This study is primarily
concerned with Navy medicine's preparation and response to the wartime/
contingency mission.
2. Day-to-Day Operational Support
The day-to-day operational support mission provides active duty Navy medical
personnel, or "blue suit" personnel, to support the fleet, Fleet Marine Force (FMF),
and Out of the Continental United States (OCONUS) Military Treatment Facilities
(MTFs)/Dental Treatment Facilities (DTFs), and to sustain the well being of the
fighting force in preparation to go to war.
3. Peacetime Health Benefit
The peacetime health benefit mission provides health care to other eligible
beneficiaries through the military treatment facilities and the TRICARE program.
As budgetary and legislative pressures continue "rightsizing" the Navy, Navy
medicine has responded by developing the Total Health Care Support Readiness
Requirements (THCSRR) model. This model allows Navy medicine to accurately
determine and project its active duty manpower readiness requirements to the
subspecialty level based on the first two readiness missions of Navy medicine:
wartime/contingency and day-to-day operational support to the fleet and Fleet Marine
Force (FMF). [Ref. 3]
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE READINESS STRATEGY
1. Medical Readiness Strategic Plan (MRSP) 2001
The Department of Defense (DoD) strategy for enhancing medical readiness
to meet the defined missions is contained in the Medical Readiness Strategic Plan
(MRSP) 2001 . [Ref. 2] This plan provides a coordinated and synchronized approach
to achieve and sustain medical readiness through the year 200 1 and beyond. It is the
DoD guidebook by which the services will achieve a fully capable military health care
system ready to support the continuum of military operations. The MRSP is
organized into nine functional areas; planning, requirements, command and control,
logistics, medical evacuation, manpower, training, blood, and readiness oversight.
The plan outlines the medical capability required to support the continuum of military
operations. Within these functional areas it specifically lists the following required
capabilities:
Military health care providers that are physically fit to deploy, and who
are highly trained in the art of military medicine.
Military health care providers trained with the supplies and equipment
of their respective deployable units.
Military (medical and non-medical) leaders at all levels who are well
founded in military medical doctrine, tactics, techniques and
procedures.
Mission capable medical units and individuals who are ready for rapid
mobilization and strategic deployment to sustain medical support for
any mission within the operational spectrum.
Units with increased flexibility and mobility that can be tailored for a
variety of potential missions.
A medical evacuation system that incorporates multiple evacuation
platforms into a seamless intra-and inter-theater patient evacuation
system; and that employs interoperable patient movement items that
function on any evacuation platform.
Medical information management systems that accommodate command
and control, medical logistics and patient accountability.
Senior leaders who recognize advancements in medical practice and
technologies and are able to provide medical care during any contin-
gency and under the most austere conditions.
2. Medical Readiness Skills Training
To meet the unique medical training requirements associated with the MRSP
2001, DoD issued the Military Readiness Skills Training instruction. [Ref. 4] This
instruction implements policy, assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures for
developing and sustaining comprehensive systems for providing, assessing, and
monitoring military medical skills training essential for all military personnel,
healthcare personnel and medical units. Key procedures are:
All military personnel are expected to receive military medical skills
training; however, training should be focused first on early deployers
to support the major contingency plans.
Healthcare personnel shall receive an orientation to the member's
assigned billet for mobilization or deployment and an annual opera-
tional unit mission briefing. The goal is to conduct this in an
environment and with the type of equipment that the member will use
upon deployment.
A healthcare provider's medical readiness status shall be included into
the Centralized Credentials Quality Assurance System.
Annual fitness reports shall include a statement of medical readiness
training compliance.
All healthcare personnel shall perform at least five days of medical
readiness training annually. Training shall focus on participative,
hands-on, and team building unit training, with the unit or like unit with
which they are scheduled to deploy or backfill. Training shall address
the individual, collective, unit and leadership skills required to perform
their individual assignments.
Medical personnel shall perform five days ofmedical readiness training
every three years with their designated operational unit.
Each military service is responsible to further define these basic requirements
to meet specific missions. Navy Medicine's medical readiness requirements are set
forth within Bureau ofMedicine and Surgery instruction 6440.5A. This is commonly
referred to as the Medical Augmentation Program.
D. MEDICAL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
The Medical Augmentation Program (MAP) is the crux of this study. It
defines the specific, non-negotiable medical readiness training and related items
applicable to Navy Medicine. The MAP instruction is designed to ensure that active
duty Navy Medical Department personnel are identified and trained to readily staff
and operate operational and medical platforms supported by Navy medicine.
A substantial portion of the medical personnel requirements for the wartime
mission are met through a process termed augmentation. Active duty medical
personnel augment the operational and medical support units deployed in situations
ranging from limited contingencies to global warfare. Peacetime staffing levels ofthe
Fleet Marine Force, Casualty Receiving Treatment Ships (CRTS), and Out of the
Continental United States Military/Dental Treatment Facilities (OCONUS MTF/
DTFs) are maintained below operational staffing levels because of the difference
between peacetime and wartime medical workload. Additionally, deployable medical
systems such as fleet hospitals have no peacetime staffing and hospital ships maintain
only a reduced operating crew during peacetime. Because of this situation, personnel
who will eventually staff these platforms must be prepared to operate effectively
when called upon. A more detailed description ofthe program is presented in Chapter
III.
E. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Medical Augmentation Program with respect to medical readiness. The level of
analysis is the day-to-day management of the program. The research questions are:
1.
To what extent do Navy medicine personnel meet the requirements of
the Medical Augmentation Program?
2. Is Navy medicine ready to expeditiously shift from peacetime medicine
to the wartime/contingency mission?
3. What changes in policy and procedures are needed to address any
identified discrepancies in the program?
F. SCOPE
The scope of this study is primarily limited to post- 1990 readiness training
methods. The study is limited to unclassified material. Operating platforms and
personnel in the San Diego area are the primary source of information.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides a detailed background of military medicine in combat. It
highlights the stark differences between peacetime and wartime/contingency medical
support.
Chapter III presents data from five sources: (1) quotes from Navy leadership
are used to give their views of the medical readiness issues; (2) a readiness study
conducted at Health Service Support Office, Jacksonville Florida; (3) readiness
reports from a major medical command; (4) an interview with Naval Medical Center
San Diego's Medical Mobilization officer; and (5) brief descriptions of what other
Navy medicine commands are doing to achieve readiness. This chapter illustrates
there is a readiness problem that needs to be addressed.
Chapter IV presents conclusions and recommendations that are derived from
the information contained in Chapters I, II, and III. The recommendations are
directed towards creating a high level of operational readiness at any command
utilizing the existing organizational structure of the peacetime MTF/DTF.
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II. MILITARY MEDICINE IN A COMBAT SETTING
Medical care in a combat setting is vastly different than "military medicine"
during peacetime. This difference is what necessitates DoD's MRSP, Medical Skills
instruction, and the Navy's Medical Augmentation Program. The medical readiness
requirement begins with the basic organization and utilization ofNavy medical assets
during a conflict. This begins with a phased approach to combat casualty care
designed to return personnel to their unit as soon as possible. Four levels of medical
care are utilized during the treatment and evacuation of casualties. The level of care
concept begins with the highly mobile and progresses to facilities that are more
sophisticated, less mobile, and farther from the front line. Each level of care has
distinct training requirements related to a specific operational platform.
The quandary that Navy Medicine faces is that the spectrum of disease and
injuries in peacetime greatly differ from those most common in war. Furthermore,
when a predominantly peacetime medical system cannot successfully make an
immediate transformation to combat medicine, the consequences could be unfavor-
able.
A. LEVELS OF CARE
Level I care consists ofbasic first aid to return the person to duty or emergency
life-saving procedures sufficient to stabilize a patient for evacuation to the next level
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of care. Procedures performed at this level include intravenous fluid therapy,
antibiotic treatments, airway preservation, and the application of splints and bandages.
The Navy provides level I care aboard Navy ships and in Marine Corps units
positioned as close to the battle area as a tactical situation permits. No surgical care
is provided at level I medical facilities.
Level II care consists of general medical and surgical intervention and
temporary hospitalization. Blood and blood products are available, as are general
surgeons and other medical specialists. The Navy provides level II care aboard
aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and within Marine Corps medical
battalions.
Level III care consists of resuscitative and definitive health services. At this
level, injured personnel are given extended evaluation and treatment in-theater. The
Navy provides level III care at fleet hospitals (land-based, state of the art, tented
facilities) and hospital ships.
Level IV is longer-term, comprehensive therapy and convalescent care given
to patients who require medical support and are not expected to return to duty for an
extended period of time. Facilities that offer these levels of care are located outside
the area of operations. The Navy provides level IV care at permanent, shore-based
hospitals worldwide.
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As the level of care increases, so do the training requirements associated with
it. Level I care can be performed by a single corpsman that has attended only a basic
field medicine course. The training becomes progressively complex as the patient
reaches a level IV facility with the multitude of trained technicians required to staff
it. The level of care system is designed to treat, and evacuate if necessary, patients
with combat injuries; therefore, the following discussion emphasizes those elements
of unique wartime medical requirements and problems.
B. MILITARY MEDICINE
Until the Civil War, this country, like most other nations, provided only the
very rudiments of medical care for its war victims. Many factors contributed to
improved morbidity during the hundred years that followed. The most important of
these were the widening frontiers of medical and surgical knowledge, the more
extensive and intensive application of information previously gained in the school of
experience, and new concepts in handling battlefield casualties. A distinct and
fundamental body ofknowledge now exist that is unique to military practice and not
translatable from the civilian setting. It must be thoroughly understood by all those
responsible for the sick and wounded in wartime.
The spectrum of diseases in operational situations differs from those in the
peacetime domestic setting. Parasitic-, fly-, tick-, chigger-, louse-, and mosquito-
borne diseases must be understood by operational military doctors. Add this to the
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list of the various viral hemorrhagic fevers, diarrheal diseases, and the ubiquitous
hepatitis virus, and the complexity of the readiness requirements starts to become
clear.
The spectrum of injuries is also different in the sphere of military medicine.
Without question, these differ from the wounds seen in civilian life from the
perspective of the multiplicity of wounds in any given individual, as well as the
magnitude of injury. As military weapons become increasingly lethal, the potential
exists for these differences to grow even greater. The military medicine specialist
must recognize the unique wounding characteristics ofhigh velocity bullets, shrapnel,
and mines. Burns are also a common form of injury. The spectrum of burns in the
military setting is also different from that seen by civilian physicians. The uniqueness
of etiology, and the differing treatment requirements of burns from napalm,
incendiaries, flame munitions, and white phosphorus create unique knowledge
requirements for military medical specialist. [Ref. 5] In addition, there is an
increasing threat of chemical warfare. These knowledge requirements must be
acquired and maintained in the most efficient manner possible to ensure readiness.
When they are not, the consequences could be severe.
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C. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REVIEW OF OPERATION
DESERT STORM AND IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED IN THE
NAVY'S WARTIME MEDICAL CARE PROGRAM
At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Forces and
Personnel, Committee on Armed Service, House of Representatives, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) [Ref. 6] reviewed the capabilities ofNavy medical units
that supported Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Specifically, the GAO
determined whether the Navy's medical units (1) were prepared to perform their
assigned missions, (2) experienced problems in identifying and deploying medical
personnel, (3) were staffed with trained personnel, and (4) had their required
equipment and supplies.
1. Preparation for Assigned Missions
On 8 August 1990, without warning, the Iraqi Armed Forces struck across the
Kuwait border and occupied the country within days. The United States and the
United Nations responded. The Navy eventually deployed almost 12,000 medical
personnel to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Over two-thirds of
these personnel deployed to units comprising the second and third levels of the
Navy's four-level system of care for war casualties. The Navy demonstrated its
ability to rapidly provide significant medical capabilities in-theater. Within 5 days
of activation, the hospital ships were deployed and en route to the Persian Gulfwhere
they arrived to treat casualties. The deployment ofthe fleet hospitals showed that pre-
positioned, deployable medical systems could be assembled and fully operational
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within a combat zone in about 2 weeks. However, there were some significant
problems early in the mobilization.
Navy medical units were given missions by the theater command that they
were neither designed, staffed, nor equipped to perform. These missions included
handling more casualties than they were designed to handle, providing noncombat
medical care, supporting the evacuation of casualties out of theater, and receiving
large numbers of chemically contaminated casualties. [Ref. 6]
2. Deployment and Assignment of Medical Personnel
It became evident early on that many augmented personnel were unsure what
platform that they were to be assigned to, what they were to bring, or when they
would be leaving. They were unaware of the mission, capabilities, and limitations of
their assigned platform. There were countless instances ofpersonnel who had been
assigned to a platform for which they were not trained. [Ref. 6]
The personnel information systems used to assign individuals to Navy medical
units contained incomplete and outdated information. Many physicians and nurses
who were scheduled to deploy did not do so for a variety of reasons. Medical
facilities are responsible for maintaining an up-to-date readiness checklist for each
individual assigned to a deploying medical unit. However, according to Navy
officials, some individuals on the rosters were found to be nondeployable for reasons
that should have been documented, including illnesses and injuries, pregnancies, and
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ongoing legal issues. Many revisions were made to the rosters ofpersonnel who were
to deploy during the first phase of the operations. An official at one unit estimated
that between one-third and one-half of the assigned personnel were replaced in the
three days between the posting ofthe original roster and the deployment to Southwest
Asia. In another unit, over 20 percent of the personnel identified through the
augmentation system did not deploy. Although these problems did not ultimately
delay the activation of medical units in-theater, they did result in the deployment of
some unqualified personnel. [Ref. 6]
3. Training
Many personnel assigned to hospital ships and fleet hospitals arrived in theater
without completing necessary operational training. Regarding the fleet hospital and
hospital ships, less than 10 percent ofNavy physicians who deployed were trained in
the treatment ofchemically contaminated patients. Less than 20 percent of personnel
who deployed with the fleet hospitals had received fleet hospital construction and
operation training. Medical personnel said that the fleet hospital training was
instructive but should be broadened to offer participants an opportunity to practice
medicine under field conditions. [Ref. 6]
Less than half of those assigned to hospital ships had received instruction in
firefighting, shipboard orientation, damage control, and chemical, biological, and
radiological defense. Another major deficiency during the Gulf War involved the
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lack of training and experience in treating trauma patients. Although the physicians
and nurses who deployed were described as experienced and competent, many of
them had never treated trauma patients, and a majority of them had not completed
training in combat casualty care. [Ref. 6]
4. Equipment
Fleet hospitals were equipped with technology from the 1970s and early 1980s.
Because of the age of the equipment, most of the personnel assigned to the fleet
hospitals had not trained with several unique field pieces of equipment before they
arrived in theater. Other problems noted were out-of-cycle calibration of equipment,
compatibility problems with supplies, discrepancies between recorded and actual
inventories, and equipment and supplies not packed to their manifests. This concern
was compounded by a belief shared by many of the physicians, particularly those
assigned to the fleet hospitals, that some of the equipment and supplies were of poor
quality and did not incorporate technological advances. As a result, several
physicians bypassed the official supply system and personally asked medical facilities
and private practices in the United States to send specific items directly to them.
Personnel also raised concerns about the ability to obtain equipment and supplies
necessary to treat mass casualties and to perform other missions. [Ref. 6]
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D. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the unique characteristics of
medical care in the combat setting. The basic organization of medical care and types
and severity of injuries/diseases are very different from what Navy medicine manages
in peacetime. As illustrated in section C of this chapter, the transition from peacetime
medicine to combat medicine is full of potential difficulties and challenges. The
greatest challenge ofNavy medicine is to ascertain the ability of a largely peacetime
medical system to mobilize and support combat operations. The Medical Augmenta-
tion Program (MAP) provides the policy and means to achieve this transition.




III. EVALUATION OF THE MEDICAL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
In this chapter, the effectiveness of the MAP in preparing Navy Medicine for
the wartime/contingency mission is examined. Data from multiple sources are used
including direct quotes from Navy medicine's leadership, a medical readiness study,
training reports, an interview with the Medical Mobilization (MEDMOB) officer at
Naval Medical Center San Diego (NMCSD), and some brief descriptions of what
some Navy medicine commands are doing in regards to medical readiness. When
applicable, the data are compared with the GAO report findings summarized in
Chapter II.
As described in Chapter II, the needs of combat medicine are distinctly
different from the practice of "military medicine" in the peacetime setting. The fact
that most medical personnel are not exposed to this difference until an actual
contingency, prevents Navy medicine from genuinely knowing how ready for war it
is. Often years, and sometimes decades, go by without a real test of the system. To
prepare medical personnel for future conflicts, BUMED has established minimum
training requirements that are platform specific. These requirements are designed to
give medical personnel a basic knowledge of providing health care in a combat
environment. Along with these training requirements, there are personal readiness
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requirements that are universal regardless of platform assignment. The policy
designed to fulfill these requirements is the Medical Augmentation Program.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE MEDICAL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
The Medical Augmentation Program (MAP) is the primary source for guidance
in the deployment and assignment of medical personnel. The MAP is organized to
carry out its intent in a directive, top down approach. The basic organization is:
Chief. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery fBUMED)
BUMED is overall responsible for:
Directing, coordinating and monitoring the alert notices and execution
of the MAP.
Monitoring and filling operational and fleet support active duty
augmentation requirements as established by the MAP.
Prescribing readiness training requirements appropriate for the opera-
tional platforms supported.
Monitoring the operational medical augmentation requirements of each
augmentation receiving unit by designator and specialty. Matching
augmentation receiving unit requirements with augmentation source
unit resources and coordinating taskings through Navy Health Care
Support Offices (HSO) to meet the requirements.
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Navy Healthcare Support Offices (HSO)
The HSOs are responsible for:
Coordinating assignment ofCONUS MTF and DTF personnel to MAP
receiving units.
Monitoring training status of individuals assigned.
Performing annual readiness reviews of, and assist visits to, CONUS
MTFs and DTFs to verify MAP readiness posture and overall program
conformity.
Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities (MTF/DTF)
The CONUS MTFs and DTFs are responsible for:
Assigning and notifying qualified individuals of their mobilization
assignments.
Bringing each member to C-l (the required level) status within 60
working days of assign-ment to an augmentation platform.
Maintaining a command data base that will satisfy all information
requirements listed in the MAP.
Submitting readiness reports to the HSO, as directed.
Developing a detailed standard Operating Procedures manual that
details all phases of augmentation.
Establishing a mechanism for entry and exit interviews to review
records for MAP assignment information, initiate the readiness check-
list process, or remove personnel from MAP assignment.
Assigning personnel to BUMED directed readiness training.
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At the MTF/DTF level, execution ofMAP requirements is the responsibility
of the Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence officer (POMI). The POMTs
department/division is commonly referred to as Medical Mobilization (MEDMOB).
An excerpt from a BUMED Medical Readiness Division memo sent to all Navy
medical commands gives a good description of the POMI's day-to-day routine:
Take a moment to consider the size of your command and the
relationship it has to the assets you have placed against that for the
accomplishment of the readiness mission. We expect those people to
track the entire membership of the active duty force. We expect them
to coordinate their efforts with education and training, manpower, the
HSOs, the readiness platform commands and BUMED. We expect
them...reporting on a multitude of data streams to enable the reporting
of the readiness status of our personnel and thus our capability of
support to the CINC's requirements. We expect them to be responsive
to the demands of the staff for moves from platform to platform; to
reasons for non-conformance with required training or administrative
readiness items; and to chase down the staffwhen necessary. [Ref. 7]
As stated above, the POMI is expected to track the entire membership of the
command's active duty force. This refers to all individuals at a command assigned
to an operational platform. At Naval Medical Center San Diego, for example, there
are 2000 personnel assigned to 24 operational platforms. These personnel are tracked
by a staff officer who basically must request (as opposed to having authority) that
personnel meet their readiness obligations. The system is large and with personnel
changing duty stations on an average of every three years, very dynamic.
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1. Personnel Readiness
The POMI is required to maintain and update an Individual Readiness
Checklist (IRC) for all command personnel once a platform assignment is made.
These checklists are designed to be inclusive and monitor such things as whether or
not personnel are physically and dentally qualified, up to date on required
immunizations, have a valid identification and Geneva convention card, dog tags, pay
and accurate personnel records, up-to-date emergency data, powers of attorney, wills,
etc. This part ofthe MAP is formally referred to as an individual's C-status. Varying
degrees of compliance will define an individual's C- status as C-l, C-2, C- 3, or C-4.
Per current instruction, all augmentees must be maintained at a C-l status. Table 1
shows the percentages of readiness items that must be obtained to maintain each C-
starus. All personnel assigned to a platform are required to be C-l within 60 days of
being assigned to a platform.
Table 1. C-Status Readiness Percentages
C-0 on board less than 60 days
C-l greater than 90% complete
C-2 greater than 75% complete
C-3 greater than 60% complete
C-4 less than 60% complete
C-5 administratively not qualified (LIMDU,
legal)
Source: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Instruction 6440. 5A.
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No individual can be assigned to more than one operational platform. All
command personnel are eligible for assignment except the CO, XO, Command Master
Chief, POMI staff, and nondeployables (pregnant, limited duty, etc.).
2. Training
Navy Medicine's most important role is to provide appropriately trained
personnel to support the combat forces. The responsibility to ensure a ready force
ultimately lies with the commanding officer of each installation. Each individual
assigned to a platform also has a responsibility to maintain personal readiness.
The MAP has an extensive list of training courses that must be completed
before a person is categorized as "Ready for Deployment." Training requirements for
augmentees differ by platform. Varying degrees of compliance will define an
individual's training status as T-l, T-2, T-3, or T- 4. All personnel assigned to a
platform must be T-3 or better (completed at least 55 percent of the training
requirements). Table 2 shows the percentage of training requirements that must be
completed to maintain a required level of T-status.
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Table 2. T-Status Readiness Percentages
T-0 on board less than 60 days
T-l greater than 85% complete
T-2 greater than or 70% complete
T-3 greater than or 55% complete
T-4 less than 55% complete
T-5 no training required (not assigned to a
platform)
Source: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Instruction 6440. 5A.
MTFs/DTFs are directed to budget for and execute readiness training
consistent with BUMED direction and requirements listed by the MAP. Upcoming
training events and courses are largely the responsibility of the individual to seek out
and attend. The MAP does not direct formulation of a command readiness training
plan nor does it require formal indoctrination ofmission, capabilities and organization
of assigned platform.
3. Activation of the MAP
In the event of a partial or full-scale mobilization, each platform draws its
personnel from a specific augmentation sourcing unit. The textbook definition of the
MAP identifies it as "The process by which wartime medical requirements are filled
by active duty personnel with the required officer and enlisted specialties to bring the
units to their full or partial wartime medical allowance." [Ref. 1]
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In order to have MAP personnel activated, the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery receives alert and activation orders from the Chief of Naval Operations.
Potential augmentation personnel are notified via their POMI. Communication
between specific augmentation receiving units and sourcing units determines mix and
number ofpersonnel to be augmented. Transportation arrangements to the receiving
unit are the responsibility of the parent command. Reporting responsibility belongs
to the receiving unit once the augmentee arrives.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
In order to evaluate the MAP, it is necessary to examine the ultimate outcome
of the program, that is, readiness. Is Navy Medicine ready?
1. Assessment of Military Leadership
Vice Admiral Hagen, the previous Navy surgeon general, said in testimony
before the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee,
Readiness remained the raison d'etre for Navy medicine. Successful
deployments to Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Croatia are all
evidence ofhow well prepared Navy medical personnel are. [Ref. 8]
Not discounting these successful deployments, the term "readiness" must be
associated with "responsiveness." The above statement characterizes deployments
made with ample time to prepare and/or humanitarian in design. Although humani-
tarian missions are part of the wartime/contingency mission, the readiness goal for
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Navy medicine must be to respond to a Major Regional Conflict with no preparation
time. In part, the National Strategy on Major Regional Conflicts states, "The United
States must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement U.S. forward
deployed forces." [Ref. 2]
In stark contrast to Vice Admiral Hagen's testimony is a letter from the editor
of the Medical Service Corps Professional Bulletin. It states:
The Surgeon General exposed Navy Medicine to the 'deck plate'
requirements ofGeneral Krulak, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps and
VADM Prueher, Vice Chief ofNaval Operations. They believe we do
well in the delivery of health care; they have concern with our
operational capability, training, and perhaps "day-to-day" policies in
delivering it. [Ref. 9]
These two officers are the top leadership that represent the Navy and Marine
Corps team. The assumption could be made that if they have a concern, there is a
problem. Also, this underscores the sense of urgency that permeates through the
articles and reports reviewed for this study.
Because of a significant increase in missions, Navy medicine may be called on
to support, there is intense pressure to improve readiness quickly. Along with this
increase in missions, there are the issues of "rightsizing" and managed care. The loss
of health care providers for extended periods of time to accomplish operational
training requirements is not conducive to the current focus of continuity of peacetime
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care at Navy MTFs and DTFs. Underscoring this sentiment, RADM Wright, Medical
Officer of the U.S. Marine Corps, states:
There has been tension in the system between investing in readiness
and providing health benefits. Aggravating that tension, hospital
commanders have been pushed to reduce civilian provided health care
costs. Whatever time doctors, nurses, and other providers spend on
wartime training...such as deployment exercises aboard a hospital
ship. ..forces patient referrals out of the military system, consequently
driving up those costs. The Navy is currently wrestling with the
appropriate balance and how to assess and monitor personnel and
wartime readiness. [Ref. 8]
The above statement very eloquently states that readiness will have to be
achieved without an increase in training time or budget. With the managed care
initiative, readiness training often will be perceived and treated as overhead. The loss
of a health care provider to undergo readiness training is strictly a loss to the system
with no immediate benefit.
Further evidence that all services are under pressure to improve medical
readiness training despite "rightsizing" comes from Dr. Edward Martin, Principal
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Health Affairs, he states:
An unprecedented, joint 'sizing model' being developed will likely
produce cuts, however, whatever the optimal size is deemed to be,
readiness training will have to keep improving. The pressure is
inexorable. [Ref. 8]
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This information demonstrates that, (1) there are concerns with Navy
Medicine's operational capability, (2) the Navy is wrestling with the appropriate
balance ofhow to assess and monitor personnel and wartime readiness, and, (3) the
pressure to keep improving is inexorable. All this despite Vice Admiral Hagen's
testimony that Navy Medicine is ready. Where do these trepidations come from? The
next section offers data that may explain some of them.
2. Readiness Data
a. HSO Study
A summary of a study conducted in 1995 by the Jacksonville Health
Service Support Office is presented. [Ref. 10] This study analyzed C-status (personal
readiness) and T-status (training requirements completed) of5273 active duty medical
personnel at eleven MTFs and DTFs within their area of responsibility. A survey
questionnaire was sent to the Medical and Dental Treatment facilities with every tenth
name of an alphabetic list used to evaluate information collected and reported by the
system. Table 3 summarizes the results from this study.
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Source: HSO Jacksonville study [Ref. 10].
Table 4 shows T-status results from the same study.






T-2 7 less than 1




Source: HSO Jacksonville study [Ref. 10].
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The hypothesis prior to conducting the study was that medical personal
located in the Southeastern United States (area of study) had attained high levels of
readiness. The researcher's conclusion at the completion of the study was:
The hypothesis was not confirmed. By examining the statistics
generated...only 162 people or 3 percent are C-l or C-2 or have at least
75 percent of their readiness and training qualifications.... [Ref. 10]
By the researcher's own admission, the reliability of this study is in
doubt. The researcher states:
The Medical Augmentation Program is an unreliable instrument used
today to measure the overall readiness for this area of responsibility.
There is a substantial amount of erroneous data that is reported in the
system.... [Ref. 10]
On the validity of the study, the researcher states:
The face (or content) validity or overall judgement made on the overall
appearance of the statistics is in doubt.... [Ref. 10]
Taking into account the comments of low validity and reliability about
the study, the current status ofreadiness is fundamentally unknown for the commands
represented by these data. However, such low statistics, and uncertainty itself, are
sufficiently alarming to warrant close examination of the system.
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The researcher's concern is further reflected in a BUMED letter
requesting a readiness assessment from Navy medical commands. It states:
Readiness is the highest priority in Navy Medicine. I request your
assistance in performing a comprehensive readiness assessment ofyour
command in the areas of equipment, personnel, and training...I would
like your review ofthe training needs of all individuals with a readiness
responsibility.... This would include, but not necessarily be limited to,
basic life support, advanced life support, C-4 and, where appropriate,
training in damage control, firefighting, etc., for those assigned to
shipboard platforms.... [Ref. 11]
What is being requested in the above excerpt are requirements that are
delineated very clearly in the MAP. This information should be available if the
instructions within the MAP were being carried out.
b. Sample Command Data
Every MTF and DTF are required to maintain readiness data reflecting
C and T status. The following discussion involves readiness data obtained from
another major command to illustrate the type and percentages of readiness training
measurement that are being reported. Scope ofthe data is limited to requirements that
require training 100 percent of assigned personnel. This illustrates trends of
increasing or decreasing medical readiness. Table 5 shows hospital ship readiness
percentages reported in 1996 and the results ofthe GAO report discussed earlier. The
four training requirements, damage control, firefighting, ship orientation, and Nuclear,
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Biological and Chemical/Chemical, Biological and Radiological Course (NBC/CBR-
D) are the core courses for personnel assigned to the hospital ship. The MAP requires
100 percent of assigned personnel trained in these areas.
Table 5. Hospital Ship Training Requirement and Percent








Damage Control 50 25
Fire Fighting 50 29
Ship Orientation 25 57
NBC/CBR-D 50 7
Source: Naval Medical Center San Diego and GAO Report [Ref. 6].
This table demonstrates a decline in training for three ofthe four requirements.
Table 6 provides training requirements for fleet hospital personnel and
percentages trained. Fleet hospital training-phase 1 (FH-1), phase 2 (FH-2), and
NBC/CBR-D are required for 100 percent of assigned personnel. Casualty Care (C4)
is required for all assigned medical department officers.
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Table 6. Fleet Hospital Training Requirement and Percent














Source: Naval Medical Center San Diego and GAO Report [Ref. 6].
Consistent with Table 5, this table demonstrates a low percentage of training
completed. The hospital ship and fleet hospitals are expensive, highly capable
operational platforms, but, as the GAO report pointed out, Navy medicine lacks
trained personnel to man them.
Table 7 illustrates training requirements for Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
personnel and percentages trained. Training requirements for the FMF platforms are
different for officers and enlisted. Officers attend a Medical Department Officer
Course designed to indoctrinate them about the FMF. Enlisted attend Fleet Marine
Service School (FMSS) to give them a basic overview of field medicine. The
casualty care course is the same as the fleet hospital requirements in that only medical
department officers are required to attend it. NBC/CBR-D training is required by all
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assigned personnel. The 1993 GAO report did not report on the FMF specifically.
The four areas illustrated in Table 7 require 100 percent of the assigned personnel
trained. All four requirements illustrate a low readiness status consistent with
previously presented data.









Source: Naval Medical Center San Diego.
The data from the HSO study and the command sample clearly
demonstrate that at a minimum, Navy medicine is less prepared now than reported by
the GAO after the Persian Gulf War. Also, the questions about validity indicate an
inability to ascertain true readiness status. And, if the data were considered accurate,
it clearly demonstrates an alarming trend of non-compliance in regards Navy
medicine's primary mission.
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C. NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER MEDICAL MOBILIZATION OFFICER
INTERVIEW
An interview with the POMI at Naval Medical Center San Diego was
conducted in January 1996 to acquire an understanding ofhow the readiness process
is managed at Navy medicine's largest facility. Three questions were used to
ascertain how the command meets the requirements of the MAP. Supporting 24
different operational platforms with over 2000 personnel, it is arguably the military's
largest and most dynamic medical center.
1. What are the processes for assessment and tracking of C-status/T-
status in regards to the five requirements as set forth in the MAP?
This question is further divided into the five parts that reflect the requirements
of the MAP.
a. Data required for the Individual Readiness Checklist TIRO
will be collected and maintained for each augmentee . The POMI said that MMPO
does maintain an IRC on each augmentee. However, there is no set process to ensure
the accuracy and update of this document. He said that lists reflecting C-status are
sent to departments but there is no mechanism for feedback. He continuously notifies
departments of their deficiencies, but because nothing compels them to correct and
notify him of any corrections made, it continues to be a struggle.
b. This information will be verified at least annually . The POMI
said that he currently does not verify IRCs on an annual basis but more on an "as
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needed" basis. Also, he has no set process for the systematic review and oversight of
the IRC. It is usually done only when an exercise, such as a USNS Mercy training
evolution, is conducted.
c. All personnel will be screened for previous MAP assignments
and their ability to fill vacant requirements . The POMI said that the majority of
assignments are done by automatic matching of the operational assignment and the
required Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) and Navy Officer Billet Code (NOBC). He said
the number of check-ins and check-outs greatly exceeds his ability to sit down with
each individual and extract needed information. Also, the information doesn't exist
on any type of document used during the check-in process.
d. Members will be brought to a C-l status within 60 days of
assignment. The POMI said that rarely is an individual brought to a C- 1 status within
60 days. He said it becomes a game ofnotification of discrepancies with no oversight
or feedback mechanism to see if it is accomplished. Only when the individual goes
to the required place (sickcall, legal) and fulfills the requirement does he or she get
feedback, and that is not guaranteed. He gave an example of an individual going to
sickcall to get a required immunization. Sickcall must enter this immunization into
a specific data base it can be downloaded onto his system. If this is not done, there
is no way of knowing whether or not the individual fulfilled the requirement since he
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doesn't receive any feedback on the rosters of discrepancies he sends out on a
periodical basis.
e. Mechanisms will be in place to identify and review for appro-
priate command disposition when a members C-status is less than a C-l status .
The POMI said that past efforts to review a member's C/T-status faded away as the
validity of the data base decreased. Leave/TAD requests were used as a mechanism
for checking a member's C/T-status in the past but this was discontinued as a result
of an unreliable data base.
2. What are the current relationships between MEDMOB, Opera-
tional Platforms, Department Heads, the Commanding Officer and
the Operational Readiness Quality Management Board (QMB)?
The POMI said that the USNS MERCY is the only platform that has an
organizational structure physically located at NMCSD. All other platform command
structures are located on the platform with NMCSD strictly being a personnel
resource. He said the Commanding Officer ofthe USNS MERCY utilizes the MMPO
to coordinate exercises and training events and he acts in a support role to assign and
notify personnel. He said that rosters of assigned personnel and their C/T-status are
sent from MMPO to the USNS Mercy chain-of-command as requested. But, just as
he lacks the authority to effectively notify an individual of a requirement and ensure
it is carried out, so does the Commanding Officer of the USNS Mercy. The chain of
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command of the USNS Mercy is different from the chain of command of Naval
Medical Center San Diego and thus lacks any real authority to effect requirements.
The POMI said all other operational platforms have a senior officer assigned
as the Senior Platform Leader for their particular platform. He said that no roles or
responsibilities are delineated and the platform senior officer initiative gradually
ceased to exist.
The link to the Commanding Officer is through an Executive Steering Council
(ESC) chartered Operational Readiness Quality Management Board (QMB). Nobody
on this QMB is tied to the readiness process. The POMI said this QMB has an ad-
hoc relationship with MEDMOB. As the QMB request information, he provides it.
The POMI said there are no recurring reports to higher authority within the command
that relate to the status of the Medical Center's operational readiness.
3. What are the responsibilities and chain of command for each
operational group as it pertains to readiness? Do any policies,
guidelines, or instructions delineate accountability?
The POMI said there is no NMCSD instruction that delineates operational
readiness policy, guidelines, or accountability. The methods to attain a C/T-l status
are on the back of the check-in document provided by MMPO at the time of
assignment. Assumptions are made that an individuals will be proactive and ask,
receive direction, and accomplish the necessary items to become C/T- 1 . He said the
assignment letter directs the member to report to MMPO and, at that time, training
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and personal items are explained. There is no system in place to ensure the member
reports to MMPO or follow-up procedures to recall members, if they don't show up.
The POMI said that current guidelines contained in the MAP state that key
command personnel for fleet hospitals and hospital ships shall meet regularly to
delineate training, organization, goals and objectives, and to prepare reports as
required by higher authority. The USNS Mercy command personnel do meet and
discuss the above items. However, he said the thing to remember is that along with
the USNS Mercy, he has 23 other platforms and another 1200 personnel assigned to
platforms. These platforms also need to have some type of organization to provide
oversight and guidance.
D. NAVY MEDICINE COMMAND READINESS INITIATIVES
There are numerous innovative approaches to medical readiness throughout
Navy medicine. For example, some were described in the Force Report [Ref. 12], a
quarterly Bureau ofMedicine and Surgery publication aimed at communicating ideas
and information throughout Navy medicine. Some Naval Hospitals are tying
personnel mobilization requirements with the member's birth month. On the birth
month, the member's record is reviewed, shots obtained and any further
administrative paperwork such as "page two" (personal emergency data) corrections
and wills are completed.
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Other commands are holding mobilization platform-specific stand downs and
training to get all personnel familiar with their shipmates and the requirements for the
specific platform. Stand downs are usually held in the uniform that will be worn on
the mobilization platform. Many commands have tied TAD, special liberty, leave
requests, advanced bonus requests, tuition assistance and other special requests to C-
starus.
At the Naval Hospital Patuxent River, the Commanding Officer assigned a
senior member from the command to each mobilization platform. That member is
responsible for the readiness of the junior personnel assigned to the platform. At
Naval Medical Clinic Quantico, the Commanding Officer is holding Department
Heads personally responsible for the C-status of their personnel. The readiness of
their staff is linked to their fitness report.
The command at Naval Hospital Rota recently held a C-l Status Fair. On one
of two days, everyone at the command had to show up, verify their health record,
update shots on the spot, schedule a physical exam if required, and attend to any other
requirements that were due. All of this was done through a single stop. The success
rate was very high, and only a few stragglers had to be located. At Naval Hospital 29
Palms, the command has begun giving the Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) a report on
what platform they are assigned to, what enlisted are on the same platform, and the
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C-status of the personnel. This allows the CPOs to track their people and get them
toC-1.
These approaches have been developed in response to the clear-cut need for
attaining a high state of operational readiness throughout Navy medicine. However,
with no uniform approach to the accomplishment of medical readiness requirements,
there can be no consistency in the results. All the methods described above are
dependent upon the leadership of the command and their presence for any continuity.
They demonstrate a sporadic, non-sustainable, non-system oriented approach to
medical readiness.
E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The primary purpose of this chapter was to illustrate that there is ample reason
to be concerned with the medical readiness of Navy medicine. The concerns and
thoughts of top leadership are supported by the data from the HSO study [Ref. 10]
and command training percentages. Review of the data supports the notion that the
deficiencies of the Persian Gulf War continue to affect Navy medicine today. This
is illustrated in the lack of any organizational structure to notify and receive feedback
on readiness- related issues, and no representation or reporting within the command.
MTF/DTFs approach meeting readiness requirements differently because
BUMED allows significant latitude on how to carry out the intent of the MAP. The
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data in this section indicates that medical readiness in the Navy has not improved
since the Persian Gulf War, and there is every indication it has become worse.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The Medical Augmentation Program (MAP), as written, is not effective. This
is illustrated by the fact that the state of medical readiness throughout Navy Medicine
is lower now than reported by the GAO in 1993. The data presented in Chapter III
clearly illustrates this fact through four different sources: (1) top leadership's
reservations on Navy Medicine's operational ability, (2) HSO and command data that
demonstrate low readiness statistics, (3) a POMI's frustration on getting anything
accomplished because of the lack of command participation, and (4) a variety of
temporary methods to accomplish Navy medicine's most important mission.
As clearly stated by the Navy's Surgeon General in the MAP [Ref. 1], Navy
medicine's primary responsibility and most important mission is to provide combat-
ready professional medical personnel to support the Operating Forces ofthe Navy and
Marine Corps team. Can Navy Medicine meet this expectation? Yes, however,
responding in a timely and knowledgeable manner is in doubt. The low readiness
statistics equate to numerous requirements an individual must accomplish prior to
deploying to the theater of operations. Navy Medicine must prepare for a Major
Regional Conflict in progress with medical support required immediately. The
presumption must be that there will not be time to figure out the equipment that is
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significantly different than that used in peacetime, no time to understand the mission
and the delivery of healthcare that goes with it, no time to que up in long lines and
take care of some basic personal necessities such as power of attorney, wills and
immunizations. But, the most obvious problem of all is that medical readiness
requirements are determined by higher authority and as Chapter III illustrates, Navy
medicine doesn't come close to fulfilling them.
The question, then, becomes what does Navy medicine need to do to increase
medical readiness? This analysis shows that two issues must be taken into account.
First, we must consider the first part of the readiness definition: "the ability to
mobilize, deploy and sustain field medical services for any operation requiring
military services." "To mobilize and deploy" means the ability to move from the
peacetime setting to the operational setting. This is best achieved when the member
is personally ready and has preconceived notions of what it is he/she will be doing
upon arrival. Being personally ready is measured by C-status and being familiar with
the operational environment. To be familiar with the operational environment
requires constant learning and reinforcement of even the most basic concepts. But,
before Navy medicine can expect to confront the more complex readiness issues of
combat medicine, it must take care of the very basic needs measured by the C-status.
Next, although the MAP is concise in its requirements, it lacks accountability
and a viable means to effect command involvement and commitment. To achieve this
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the program must be organized into manageable components at the MTF/DTF level.
A good illustration of where this would be best applied is Naval Medical Center San
Diego. With sole responsibility to assign and track over 2000 medical personnel to
operational platforms, the POMI has been reduced to becoming a data base manager.
Centrally organizing the program in this manner inhibits active participation by
anyone other than the POMI staff. There is no way for someone's opinion or idea to
get into the readiness system and be noticed. Finally, command-wide involvement
is paramount if a sustainable outcome is to be achieved.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
There should be a uniformly organized medical readiness process at each Navy
medicine command. This is especially vital as Navy medicine moves towards what
is referred to as the "Component Unit Identification Code" (component UIC) concept.
This is a separate UIC that identifies an individual's assigned operational platform.
Individuals will know what their platforms are prior to reporting to the MTF/DTF.
This is the first implementation of the THCSSR model discussed in Chapter I.
The following five recommendations are designed to create a framework for
a viable readiness organization. This readiness organization will parallel the existing
MTF organization and require no additional manpower or funding. These recommen-
dations are designed to be implemented throughout Navy medicine through inclusion
of a revised MAP instruction.
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The first three recommendations increase command involvement through
active participation with the readiness process. Every position described will focus
on a specific area of responsibility and contribute to the overall goal of a high level
of sustained readiness. And, most importantly, it allows the system to move towards
a state of continuous improvement.
The last two recommendations will satisfy a real need to provide basic
readiness orientation to all command personnel and to establish roles and responsi-
bilities for all participants in the readiness process. This is important to ensure the
readiness process continues as command leadership changes.
1. Decentralize the Medical Readiness Process at the Command Level
This could be accomplished by appointing Senior Enlisted Leaders (SEL) as
Readiness Coordinators for their directorate. By virtue of the military organization,
all commands have senior enlisted at the top of each chain of command within the
organization. The purpose is to decentralize the process and allow for communication
of readiness requirements in a systematic and manageable method. This will ensure
that department heads within a given directorate are duly notified of all readiness-
related items in a timely and efficient manner. In turn, the department heads will have
a knowledgeable individuals to assist them during the execution of such items.
This is an appointment of a position, not an individual. The SEL should be a
permanently assigned position at the top of each chain-of-command with definitive
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span of control and accountability. Additionally, this will lend continuity to the
readiness function as the SEL is replaced and the function is transferred to the next
assigned person.
The Readiness Coordinators should participate in a continuous verification of
the operational readiness data base maintained by MEDMOB. This can be
accomplished by a review of platform assignments and training needs on a monthly
or as-needed basis to ensure its accuracy. By utilizing this part of the organization,
accomplishment and verification of C/T status can be reduced to a manageable level.
MEDMOB should continue to obtain training quotas and coordinate training
exercises. Training quotas should be managed based on the demand to fulfill the
related requirement and final selection for attendance should be managed by the
affected individual's department/directorate. This will allow the end users of the
training to actively participate in the formulation of the training plan since their
department will participate in their selection. An overall philosophy of getting the
right person to the right training at the right time is the focus of this effort.
2. Assign a Platform Operations Officer along with a Senior Officer
to Each Operational Platform Group the Command Supports
The MAP requires the senior officer/enlisted of deployable platforms to meet
frequently for the purpose of training, organizational administration, establishing
goals and objectives, etc., and to report issues and concerns to BUMED via the chain
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of command. This should be taken one step further with the assignment of an
operations officer for each group of platforms. This individual would become the
command expert for a specific group of operational platforms. The primary functions
are to oversee the readiness of personnel assigned to that group of platforms and
assist MEDMOB in the formulation and preparation of platform specific plans and
policies.
The Platform Operations officers should be required to report the readiness
status oftheir assigned platforms to the Commanding Officer on a regular basis. This
would interject a continuous improvement function into the readiness process through
independent oversight.
Additionally, this individual should represent the command in collaboration
with operational platforms to develop training opportunities and exercises. Opera-
tional platform groups, at a minimum, should include; Fleet Marine Force, Casualty
Receiving Treatment Ships, hospital ships and Mobil Medical Augmentation Readi-
ness Teams.
The Platform Operations officer should be selected on the basis of prior
experience and personal motivation for the position. Optimally, this should be a non-
clinician to minimize time away from patient care. In addition, the officer need not
be assigned to the platform. This will ensure the command utilizes the talent of the
best qualified and motivated person.
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3. Establish a Quality Management Board (QMB) That Represent the
Positions Responsible for the Readiness Process
This QMB should be composed of personnel who are jointly responsible for
the readiness process. The membership would be cross-functional and, at a minimum,
should include Platform Operations officers, a representative Readiness Coordinator,
the MEDMOB officer and a department head (to represent their interests). This QMB
should develop the process improvement plan for the command's overall readiness
objective.
4. Develop a Comprehensive Platform Indoctrination
This would satisfy a major requirement of the DoD Medical Skills instruction
discussed in Chapter I. Specifically stated, "Healthcare personnel shall receive an
orientation to the member's assigned billet for mobilization or deployment and an
annual operational unit mission briefing."
The core curriculum should be oriented to the assigned member's operational
platform Billet Sequence Code (BSC). The BSC identifies the responsibilities of the
member on the operational platform, and this often does not correspond to the
member's assignment at the MTF in peacetime. When the receiving operational
platform requests augmentation it will request it by BSC. Topics should include:
The mission, capabilities, and limitations of all operational platforms
Navy Medicine is responsible for augmenting. To truely understand a
specific operational platform, an understanding of the entire spectrum
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ofmedical support to the combat forces is necessary. This would bring
an understanding of how the physical environment of a level of care
corresponds with the equipment and materials provided to support it.
A walk through of a typical augmentation process. Starting with what
happens at time of notification right through to full mobilization
supporting global warfare. Walk an individual through the process
from work center to his/her position on the platform and back home.
The concepts and philosophy of combat triage and medical regulation
as they relate to every platform Navy medicine supports. This should
be completely didactic and not intended to replace the traditional hands
on triage courses.
The above information should be provided during an annual readiness update
session for each platform group a command supports. This would be accomplished
through coordination with the MEDMOB, Platform Operations officer, gaining
operational platform, and StaffEducation and Training. It should be given throughout
a designated training month to minimize loss of clinical time and to ensure personnel
on TAD/leave/other commitments attend the training. This would be no longer than
one day in length.
5. Every Command Promulgate its Own Operational Readiness
Instruction
The purpose of this would be to bring all aspects of the readiness function into
one locally relevant document. This should ensure the readiness process continues
throughout personnel changes and keeps the process active. It should clearly define
roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the operational readiness QMB. Platform
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Operations officers, MEDMOB, Dental, Staff Sickcall, etc. This instruction should
reference DoD and BUMED for identification of requirements.
C. SUMMARY
The solution for ensuring medical readiness is the commitment of its
personnel. This commitment can not be dependent on leadership alone. An
organizational structure must be in place with roles, responsibilities and measurement.
The above five recommendations would create this organization along the lines of
any existing Navy medicine command but are specifically designed for Navy
medicines three largest MTFs, Naval Medical Centers San Diego and Portsmouth and
Naval Hospital Bethesda. These commands will continue to support multiple
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